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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEONARD BATES,
Plaintiff and Appellaml,
-vs.ODELL WALKER BUR.NS, and ODELL
WALKER BURNS, FARRELL BURNS
and FRANK D. BURNS, doing business
as a copartnership in the name and style
of BURNS FEED AND SUPPLY COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
8207

BRIEF ·OF· PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF' CASE
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages
for personal injuries to himself and to property because
of the negligence on the part of the defendants.. On the
9th day of October, 1952, at around 2 o'clock P.M. at the
intersection of Public Highway No. 91 and Highway No.
114, otherwise known as Geneva Road, and on the north
side of Highway 91, known as T'hird West Street in
Pleasant Grove, Utah County, Utah, the defendant, Odell
Walker Burns, was traveling West on Highway 91 and
negligently, carelessly and heedlessly drove defendants'
G.M.C. tractor and trailer loaded with twelve tons of
coal, a motor vehicle, into the right side of plaintiff's
emp~ty 1941 one ton International Pickup truck automoL..
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bile which the piaintiff was driving North on Highway
114, known also as Geneva Road and as 3rd West Street
in Pleasant Grove, Utah. As a result the plaintiff was
injured severely. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict for damages in favor of the plaintiff in
the total amount of $5, 779.50. The verdict reads (omitting the Court and case and title), as follows :
We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled
cause, find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants jointly and severally and
assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
Physical injury, p·ain and suffering________ $ _ __
Medical Exp·enses --------------------------·--------------$ 214.50
Loss of earnings during recuperation ______ $1,000.00
Permanent disability ------------------------------------$4,000.00
Pickup truck --------------------------------------------------$ 565.00
Total ---------------------_----------------------------------$5,779.50
Dated March 16, 1954.
Signed: Waldo Lamoreaux
Foreman
The Court, notwithstanding the verdict, on motion of
defendants, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the verdict and judgment enteTed therein in favor of the plaintiff he set aside and ordered, adjudged and decreed that
judgment he entered in favor of defendants and against
the plaintiff, NO CAUSE. OF· ACTION, and that defendants recover their costs, on the theory that plaintiff was
contributarily negligent as a matter of law and that the
verdict is against the law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
The plaintiff ruppeals from the judgment by the
Court upon the ground that the· Court faile;d to accept
as true in arriving at its decision all the competent evidence in favor of the plaintiff, and further failed to give
the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable! inference
which reasonably could be drawn from such evidence.
The court also erred in its interpretation of the evidence·,
and in arriving at its conclusion included as evidence
matters which it had specifically excluded from evidence
during the trial of the case. The Court also erred in
showing in its judgment a cipher opposite the first item
appearing in the verdict of the jury, "Physical injury,
pain and suffering" when no such cipher appeared in the
original verdict handed in by the jury, thus showing a
variance between the actual verdict of the jury and the
Court's version of it, and then refusing to delete it although on motion duly requested so to do.
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", a map or sketch to a scale
of 1" equals 25 feet, showing the intersection and surrounding area where the accident occurred, also scale
to the rna p, Exhibit "F" ( Tr. 12), were both identified,
introduced and received in evidence, excepting therefrom
the markings upon the highway on the map Exhibit "A"
with respect to distances ( Tr. 3 and 8, 9 and 10 exclude-d
the markings). Herbert M. Felunel, engineer No. 3 for
the State Road Commission, testified he drew the map
to measurement on a scale 1" equals 25 feet. He also
identified the scale to the ma;p or sketch as Exhibit "F"
(Tr. 13-14) as also being gauged 1" equals 25 feet. Healso testified that where the ~sight line from the southeast
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corner of Highway 114 at the stop sign intersects the
center line of Highway 91 in an easterly direction was a
distance of 368 feet from the center line of Highway 114
at the scene of the impact in the intersection of the two
highways (Tr. 12). Mr. Fehmel further testified that
the black markings or lines crossing the center line of
Highway 91 were ~ngineering stations 100 feet apart.
Mr. Holdaway t.estified that he had stopped at the
stop sign on the N (lTthwest corner of 3rd North Street
in Pleasant Grove ("Highway 114) and Highway 91. He.
marked an "X" on the map to show approximately where
the front of his car would be while there (Tr. 15). He
testified that he saw the coal truck approaching from the
East on Highway 91 at from 40 to 50 miles per hour (Tr.
17). That·it passed the front of his car within a few
inches (Tr. 18), and that the coal truck was 50 to 75 feet
from him when its brakes were first applied..
Plaintiff Bates testified he waited for some minutes
at stop· sign before entering the intersection of Highway
91 and Highway 114. (Tr. 53). He looked both ways and
the road was clear (Tr. 53). He started across Highway 91 at 5 or 6 miles an hour in low gear (Tr. 54). His
truck was hit by the defendant's coal truck when he was
pretty near across the Highway 91. The defendant's
truck ·was about 150 feet a\vay coming very fast when he
saw it. Plaintiff attempted to speed up a little on the
last end (Tr. 54). Plaintiff's truck was damaged beyond
repair (Tr. 57) and he was injured. Plaintiff Bates and
Myrtle C. Bates, his wife, testified concerning p~laintiff's
injuries. His injuries consisted of a cut on the back of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
his head 21h" long (Tr. 59, also Tr. 27). His face was
scratched up and was a mass of abrasions ( Tr. 54 and
27). A lump, about the size of a walnut was raised on his
right cheek bone (Tr. 27). He had a lump· on his forehead ahnost as big as an egg (Tr. 27 and 54). His right
eye was swollen shut (Tr. 27). His knees were banged
up (Tr. 59). He had a sprained shoulder (Tr. 27). His
hands were swollen and he could not shut them (Tr. 27).
He had 7 fractured ribs (stipulated to by counsel for
plaintiff and defendan t.s.) ( Tr. 29 and 30). Plaintiff had
an hemorrhage from the mouth. Plaintiff was unable to
do anything and even at the time of the trial was still
unable to do anything. Plaintiff's entire body seemed to
be affected, his mind is not clear, and his memory is not
good. It was excellent before the accident (Tr. 31). He
remained in the Ameri~can Fork Hospital for three days
(Tr. 30). Ever since the accident (one year and one
half ago) the plaintiff's back has bothered him and his
side has bothered him. He has had pains in his side ( Tr.
39). Since the accident he drives a truck or car very
little. His wife does practically all of the driving ( Tr.
38).
Defendant did not see plaintiff until he was right on
him (Tr. 45). Defendant stated he saw the plaintiff as
he pulled out to start across the highway (Tr. 130). Defendant said he saw the plaintiff when the defendant was
100 feet away (Tr. 130). Plaintiff was quite aways from
the yellow line when the defendant saw him (Tr. 136).
Defendant took it for granted the plaintiff would yield
the right of way to him as he figured he was entitled to
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it (T·r. 137). D·efenda.nt says the plaintiff and defendant
were both in the intersection at the same time (Tr. 137).
Defendant says he was traveling at 35 miles p.er hour
(Tr. 137).
Dr. Christopherson was going South on Highway
114 and watched the plaintiff p·roceed across Highway 91
through the rear view mirror of his Packard automobile
and saw the pl~intiff get nearly across, or approximately
two-thirds of the way across, the highway when the coal
truck came into his vision (Tr. 97). It was then 20 feet
from the point of impact (Tr. 104). He said the impact
took p·lace from 6 to 10 feet north of the center line of
Highway 91 (Tr. 98). Dr. Christopherson did not stop
his car. He was traveling around 30 miles per hour and
slowed down to 15 to 20 miles per hour, took his foot off
the accelerator and p~ut on the brake just a little (Tr. 99).
He did not eome to a complete stop· but ~slowed down to
10 miles an hour. He went south 50 yards beyond the stop
sign from whence the plaintiff started north before the
accident occurred.
Mack Ostergaard, the peace officer for Linden, Utah
(Tr. 106) said defendant told him "I did not have a
chance. He pulled right in front of me." The defendant
said his speed was 35 miles per hour. "His d~stance from
the point-from the distance that he first noticed the
danger was 10 to 20 feet-something like that" (Tr. 108109). "There was another car p·arked by the other stop
sign on the north side of the street, and to avoid hitting
one of them ·he tried to go between the two * * *" (Tr.
108). Ostergaard said Burns knew of the dangerous
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intersection (Tr. 109). Mr. Ostergaard placed an "X"
in a circle on Exhibit "A" where he saw scuff marks and
drew parallel curved lines for 22 feet to rep,resent scuff
marks of coal truck. Ostergaard testified that the defendant's truck traveled from the point of impact and passed
between the stop ~sign and telephone pole on the northwest corner of the intersection of Highway 91 and Highway 114 (Third West in Pleasant Grove) into a lot and
hitting a shed, a distance of 188 feet. A triangle with a
"T" in it on Exhibit "A" illustrates the location of the
shack (Tr. 110). (Th·e shack also is shown on Exhibit
"A" according to the actual measurements..) The reaction
time at 35 miles per hour would be 55 feet. 55 feet plus
22 feet of brake marks would total 77 feet at 35 miles per
hour where the defendant saw the plaintiff's truck (Tr.
116 and 117). The average reaction time for the average individual is three-quarters of a second and a truck
traveling 35 miles per hour would travel one and one
half times the speed per second ( Tr. 118).
The foregoing s.ubstantially states the case, omitting
only such details as do not bear directly on this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The ruppellant will present his case under four
points:
POINT ONE
THE COURT FAILED TO ACCEPT AS TR·UE ALL OF
THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF
AND TO GIVE TO THE PLAINTIFF THE BENEFIT OF
EVERY FAVORABLE INFERENCE WHICH NATURALLY
COULD BE DRAWN FROM SUCH EVIDENCE.
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POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF
PART OF THE EVIDENCE.

POINT THREE
THE COURT RELIED UPON MATTERS WHICH IT HAD
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.

P·OINT FOUR
INACCURATELY COPYING JURY VERDICT INTO ITS
JUDGMENT AND THEN REFUSING TO CORRECT THE
ERROR.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT FAILED TO ACCEPT AS TRUE ALL OF
THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF
AND TO GIVE TO THE PLAINTIFF THE BENEFIT OF
EVERY FAVORABLE INFERENCE WHICH NATURALLY
COULD BE DRAWN FROM SUCH EVIDENCE.

Fnr the purpose of arriving at a decision of negligence .as a matter of law, the Court must take into con'sideration all the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, and give to the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference which naturally could he drawn from such
evidence. See 109 P. 2nd 1064 (Wash.) Fetterman v.

Levitch.
Here are some of the matters the Court must consider. It must take into account that plaintiff's Exhibits
"A" and "F·" are true and correct, that the plaintiff had
traveled north from the stop sign into the intersection of
Highway 91 a distance of 125 feet at a speed of approximately 5 miles p~er hour, and that the defendant was
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traveling eastward on Highway 91 at the speed rate of
50 miles ~per hour in a 40 mile zone (Tr. 17). Giving to
the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inferenc~
which naturally could be drawn from such evidence, it
means that the defendant was traveling ten times faster
than the plaintiff and that the defendant was ten times
125 feet, or a total orf 1250 feet, down Highway 91 from
the point of impact when the plaintiff started from the
stop sign into the intersection. It means that when the
plaintiff had traveled 50 feet into the intersection, at
the same ratio of ten to one, the defendant was still 750
feet away from the point of impact. Traveling another
50 feet would place the plaintiff north 100 feet from the
stop sign on to Highway 91 and at the center of said
highway. (Use Exhibits "A" and "F" for location on
map.) The defendant would then be 250 feet away from
the point of impact. While the plaintiff traveled the last
25 feet, the defendant traveled ten times as far, or 250
feet, to the point where the impact took place. On the
basis of this evidence most favorable to the plaintiff,
just where on Highway 91 would the imp~act have taken
place~ There .are certain stationary monuments that lend
a certainty to the answer. They are like rabbit tracks
in the snow. Note the stop sign on the sketch Exhibit
"A" at the northwest corner of the intersection and also
the telephone pole slightly to the southwest of it. These
two monuments are approximately 10 to 15 feet apart.
(See Exhibits "A" and "F") The coal truck of the defendants passed between these two monuments and
knocked down a shack in the vacant lot some distance
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ahead (Tr. 110). If a sight line were to he drawn from
Highway 91 northwestward so that it extended midway
between the stop sign and the telephone pole and within
inches of the ·front of the Holdaway car (Tr. 18), one
would at once be able to fix the course of the coal truck
with a fair degree of accuracy. The stop sign and the
telephone pole are visible and stationary. The Holdaway
car help~s define the eourse of defendants' truck. They
are much like the visible rabbit tracks in the snow. The
imp,act, therefore, would have occurred on what would
have been, but for the intersection of Highway 114, on
the north shoulder of Highway 91. (Use Exhibits "A"
and "F" for location on map.) That would place the
front of plaintiff's truck 5 feet over on the north shoulder
of Highway 91. Plaintiff's truck is 17 feet long. The upright on the left side of the front bumper on defendant's
coal truck struck the right front fender of plaintiff's
truck about four or more feet from the front of his
truck. (See Exhibits "B", "C", "D" and "E", particularly
Exhibit "E".) That ~simply means that the plaintiff's
truck at the time of the impact occupied only the North
12 feet, or thereabouts, of Highway 91lea:ving a clearance
of 8 feet to the south of plaintiff's truck on the north one
half of Highway 91 for defendant's coal truck to pass
p~laintiff's

truck without hitting it and still be mostly in

p-rop~er

lane. The ·defendant's truck at its widest point

its

is 8 feet wide. There is no evidence that there was any
traffic ap~proaching from the "\vest on Highway 91. In
fact, there would be none because the plaintiff had just
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crossed that lane and had there been the plaintiff would
have seen it.
The defendant was negligent in three particulars:
(1) in traveling in excess of the legal speed rate for said
district; (2) in failing to keep a p-roper lookout, and (3)
in failing to yield the right of way to the plaintiff who
had acquired it by reason of having entered the intersection first and progressed almost through it before
the defendant entered it.
1. Had the defendant traveled at a legal rate of 40
miles per hour (Tr. 17), the natural favorable inference
drawn from that fact is that the plaintiff would have been
clear of the intersection by an additional 25 feet or more.
Instead of covering 1250 feet as defendant did, defendant
would have traveled only four-fifths of that distance,
or 1000 feet. While the defendant would have traveled
that last 250 feet at 40 miles per hour, the plaintiff would
have traveled further north 31.25 feet through the intersection than he did ( 5 miles per hour is one-eighth of 40
miles per hour, one eighth of 250 feet is 31.25 feet). (Exhibits "A" and "F" will help to pinpoint plaintiff's position with regard to the intersection.) He would have been
completely through it. That would make defendant's
excessive speed doubtless the p~ro~imate cause of the
collision.
2. Had the defendant kept a p,roper lookout, he
could have driven to the rear of plaintiff's truck on Highway 91 and have avoided the accident, or he could have
slowed down for plaintiff to clear the intersection. The
defendant Burns' testimony as to the point where he first
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saw the plaintiff's truck is confusing. He said he first
saw the plaintiff's truck at the stop· sign and saw it start
up when the defendant was 100 feet away (Tr. 130).
Later he ~said he saw it when it was in the intersection
before it reached the yellow line (meaning the center line
of Highway 91), when he was 100 feet from the point of
impact. Of these two conflicting statements plaintiff is
entitled to the benefit of the defendant's testimony which
is more favorable to the plaintiff, and to every favorable
inference which naturally could be drawn from such testimony. Defendant Burns on direct examination says he
saw the plaintiff at the stop sign (Tr.130):
A. I saw this vehicle pulling out to start across
the highway and when I first saw him I
thought he saw me and would stop and permit me to pass. As I got closer I could see
he wasn't, so I turned to the right as much
as I could, hut still stay on the highway, and
he kept coming. Of course, I ran into him
* * *
That the defendant Burns meant the stop sign at the
southeast corner of Highway 114 and Highway 91 where
he saw the plaintiff there can be no doubt, for he further
says:
Q. Describe the course that the Bates truck took
from the time you first saw him, until the impact occurred, as to whether or not there were
any variations in stopp~ing or starting, or
anything of that nature.
A. As near as I could tell, there was no changing
or stopping, other than starting up, from the
stopped position which he was in. I don't
know whether he gained any speed from the
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time he left until he got there or not. It
seemed that he drove directly north and did
not turn one way or the other.
Later on cross examination the defendant testified
to just the op~posite effect, namely, that he did not see
the plaintiff until the plaintiff was approaching the center line of Highway 91. At transcript 136 plaintiff's counsel asked the defendant:
Q. Why did not you, when you first saw the
Bates' truck attempt to stop or slow down~
A. When I first saw him~
Q. Yes.
A. Well, the fact that I didn't stop or slow down
is that he was quite a long ways from the
yellow or center line of the highway, I took
for granted that he would yield the right of
way to me which I figured I was entitled to,
and I didn't know that he was going to pull
on across the highway in front of me.
Defendant knew that this w.as a dangerous intersection from much prior experience (Tr. 44), and should
have driven more cautiously on approaching this intersection. If the defendant had seen the plaintiff's truck
starting from the stop sign into the intersection as he
testified he did, and that he was then 100 feet from the
point of impact, it would be the equivalent of defendant
saying that the plaintiff was traveling at a much faster
rate of speed than that of the defendant in order that
they reach the point of impact at the same time. For
defendant's testimony to be true he would have traveled
100 feet while the plaintiff traveled 125 feet which would
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make plaintiff's appro~imate· s·peed one-sixth faster than
defendant's, or 58 miles per hour. Th~s is not tenable in
the light of all the evidence that the pJ.aintiff was traveling at the rate of 5 or 6 miles per hour, or traveling slowly across the intersection. On the other hand, if the defendant had not seen the plaintiff until he was within 100
feet of the plaintiff when the plaintiff was nearing the
center line of Highway 91 in the intersection, the defendant was not only ordinarily negligent, he was grossly
ne·gligent, in not seeing him. If the defendant had maintaind a p,roper lookout ahead he could have driven to the
rear of plaintiff's truck and thus have avoided the· accident.
3. The defendant failed to yield the right of way
to the p~laintiff after the plaintiff had clearly acquired
it hy reason of his having entered the intersection first
and having progressed nearly across it.
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 57-7-138. Vehicle~s
entering a through highway. - The driver of a
vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the
entrance to a through highway and shall yield
the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said thr<)ugh highway
or which are approaching so closely on said
through highway as to constitute an immediate
hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right of way to the vehicle
so p~roceeding into or across the through highway.
See .also 58 A.L.R. 1197 and 81 A.L.R. 185.
The defendant testified (Tr. 137): "* * * I took for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
granted that he [meaning the plaintiff] would yield the
right of way to me which I figured I was entitled to, and
I didn't knorw that he was going to p·ull on across the
highway in front of me." Referring to the point 125
feet north on Highway 91 from the point where the plaintiff started into the intersection would place the front of
plaintiff's truck 5 feet north beyond what would ordinarily he the north edge of the northwest bound traffic
lane of Highway 91. The defendants' coal truck would
have to have been driven clear across the northwest
hound lane of Highway 91 which is 20 feet wide (See
Exhibits "A" and "F") and on to what would ordinarily
he the shoulder of the road but for the intersection itself.
This is to say, that the defendant went completely out of
his course of travel and followed the plaintiff on to the
north shoulder in order for the impact to take place at
·the point of the north shoulder of Highway 91 where it
actually took I)lace. Defendant's course gave the plaintiff
no opportunity to avoid the impact of defendant's truck.
Plaintiff had one of four decisions to make. First, he had
the alternative of stopping. Traveling at the rate of five
miles per hour before plaintiff could even apply his foot
to the brake he would have traveled several feet, which.
would have placed him directly in the course of the defendants' truck. Second, he could not turn to the right
because he would he turning directly into the oncoming
coal truck of the defendants. Third, he could not make a
left angle turn; it must be turned on a curve. It will be
recalled that the Ho1daway car was stopped at the· stop
sign on the northwest corner of Highway 114 and High-
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way 91 and hy turning to his left the plaintiff would havecrashed into the Holdaway car. The only other alternative that was left to plaintiff was to attempt to speed up
to avoid the coal truck crashing into his truck. That is
exactly what the plaintiff did (Tr. 54), and that is what
any ordinary p~rudent man would have done under like
and ~similar circumstances. That is exactly what a jury
of eight intelligent men concluded after they had care~
fully listened to all of the testimony and weighed all of
the evidence in the case. (See jury verdict.) They brought
in a verdict for the plaintiff.
Defendant was clearly in the wrong in assuming that.
he had the right of way regardless of the location of
plaintiff's truck alre-ady in the right of way, for the
plaintiff had p·reempted it for three reasons: First, by
his having entered into the intersection long before the
defendant was close to it, (1250 feet away), and second,
by having traveled into the intersection so far that to all
intents and p·urposes, he was pretty well across it before
the defendant could reach the intersection, and third,
that the plaintiff, until the defendant's coal truck had
approached near enough to the intersection, could not
ascertain what was in the defendant's mind, i.e., whether
the defendant would continue forward and pass behind
plaintiff's truck; whether defendant would slow down; or
whether the defendant had seen the plaintiff in the middle of the intersection, or just what was in the defendant's mind.
The Utah case of Conklin v. Walsh, 193 P. 2nd 439, is
an intersection case. The facts are somewhat analogous
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to those of our case. Defendant A. H. Walsh Plwnbing
Co.'s truck was being driven east on South Temple Street
in Salt Lake City, Utah, an arterial highway, at a rate
of speed somewhat between 35 to 45 miles per hour. The
plaintiff Conklin's car was being driven south on "0"
Street and crossing East South Temple Street at a rate
of 10 to 15 miles per hour. The defendant saw the plaintiff's car start just north of the stop sign to cross South
Temple Street when defendant was one-quarter of a
block away. Defendant then looked to the right or ~south
and did not again look to the north until the plaintiff was
almost in front of him. The collision occurred and plaintiff sued for damages.
The Court will take judicial notice that the blocks
on the south side of South Temple Street in Salt Lake
C~ty are 10 acres and the distance from Ninth East to
Tenth East is 40 rods or 660 feet. One-quarter of a block
would be one-fourth of 660 feet, or 165 feet. In other
words, defendant was 165 feet away from the intersection
when the plaintiff was about to enter the intersection of
"0" Street and South Temple Street. The Court held
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter
of law for his failure to see the plaintiff's automobile in
time to avoid the accident. The Court said:
"The duty to ke'ep a proper lookout app1ies
as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver.
Neither driver can excuse his own failure to observe because the other driver failed in his duty.
Neither driver is at any time to be excused for
want of vigilance or failure to see what is plain
to be seen. Drivers are permitted to cross over
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arterial highways after having stop~ped. True
they mus:t yield the right of way to cars which ar~
close enough to constitute an immediate hazard.
The rule, however, required the exercise of ~some
judgment. There is still a duty on the part of
the driver traveling the arterial highway to remain reasona;hly alert to the possibility of the
disfavored driver starting across the intersection
in the belief that he can cross in safety."
The facts in our case and the Conklin v. Walsh case
are p·arallel in the following particulars:
Both .accidents. took place at an intersection where
one highway was an arterial highway. The defendant
in each case was driving on the arterial highway. Both
defendants were favored and both p~laintiffs were. disfavored drivers. Both plaintiffs had entered the intersection first. Both p~laintiffs' car-s were struck by the
cars of the defendants, and both plaintiffs suffered damages from the collisions which followed.
In our case the defendants' coal truck was 750 feet
away, or thereabouts, from the intersection when plaintiff entered it. In the Conklin v. Walsh case, the defendant Walsh was only 165 feet, or thereabouts, away from
the intersection when the plaintiff entered. In our case
the plaintiff was more than one-half way through the
intersection when he observed the defendants' truck app~roa:ching from his right 150 feet away and speeded up
to get through the intersection in order to avoid being
hit by the defendants' truck (Tr. 54). In the Conklin v.
Walsh case the plaintiff did not see the def'endant's truck
at all. In our case the defendant saw the plaintiff's car
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in intersection when he was. 100 feet away from it and
plaintiff was near the midd~e of intersection. In Conklm
v. Walsh, the defendant did not see the plaintiff's ear in
the intersection at all until it was too late to avoid the
collision. In our case defendant followed plaintiff's
truck to his right and struck it at a point which would he
5 fe'et beyond the traveled part of Highway 91 and on to
the shoulder of the road. There is another fact in our
case which is not present in the Conklm v. Walsh case,
viz: there were skid marks on Highway 91 of defendants'
coal truck for a distance of 22 feet to the point of collision. Traveling at 50 miles per hour the reaction time
of the defendant would be around 55 feet. That would
make it a total of 77 feet from the point of the collision
when defendant first saw the plaintiff in the intersection
instead of 100 feet as testified to by the defendant. Considering the respective positions of the two trucks, plaintiff's and defendants', defendant under the circumstances
could not have kept a proper lookout. There simply
would not have been sufficient time to have done so under the circumstances. There are then the statements of
the defendant (Tr. 34) to Mrs. Myrtle Bates: "I didn't
see him until just before I hit him," and to Mrs. Hilda
Pulley (Tr. 45) "* * * didn't see him, until he was right
onto him, and he applied his brakes, but it was too late."
It is clearly evident that defendant Burns did not
act reasonably alert so as to yield the right of way to
the plaintiff who had established his prior right to it by
reason of his having entered it first and having traveled
practically through it. The rules announeed in the Conk-
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lin v. Walsh case ap~plied to the facts. in our case would
require overruling the Court's decision and reinstating
the verdict of the jury.
With all of the conflict in testimony in our case it
was surely a case for the jury to decide.
Reference is made to the Utah case of Martin v.
Stevens, 243 P. 2nd 747, decided in 1952, which·is also
an intersection case, and the cases cited therein. In the
Martin v. Stevens case the plaintiff's automobile was
struck in the middle by defendant's automobile at intersection of 18th East and Stratford Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah. There was no stop sign at this intersection
and neither street was an arterial highway. Defendant
was traveling at 35 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour
zone. Plaintiff had entered intersection first. Other
facts too detailed to include in this brief resulted in a decision by the District Court in favor of defendant on
theory that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. On
appeal the Sup-reme Court held that whether the plaintiff
had been guilty of contributory negligence in not seeing
and avoiding effects of defendant's negligence, and if so,
whether such failure was proximate cause of the collision,
were questions for the jury. In the course of the opinion
(Sylihus 4) the Court among other things said, quoting
from 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Perm. Ed. Sec. 991 to 994 inclusive, pp. 206 et
seq: "* * * The second rule is easier to apply and therefore more :satisfactory, that is: * * * This rule has been
called the basic law governing operation of vehicles at
street intersections." The Court then said: "Necessity
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dictates that this rule governs unless one vehicle is
enough ahead of the other in entering the intersection
to assure him a clear margin of safety." In our case the
plaintiff had the right of way. He approached and entered the intersection so far ahead of the defendant that
no doubt could arise as to which had the right of way on
that basis. In Sylibus 7 the Court said, among other
things, that plaintiff: "* * *was not obliged to anticipate
either that other drivers would drive negligently, nor fail
to accord him his right of way, until in the exercise of due
care, he observed, or should have observed, something
to warn him that the other driver was driving negligently
or would fail to accord him his right of way." (For the
same rule of law see Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163
P. 2nd 510.) The question is truly for the jury to decide
as plaintiff observed the defendants' truck when it was
150 feet down the highway. At this point, when he was
over half way across the highway, defendant apparently
had not seen plaintiff in the intersection, and was making
no attempt to slow down in order to avoid a collision.
Plaintiff then tried to speed up~ and to avoid the accident
and defendant followed in the direction that the plaintiff was going instead of trying to pass to plaintiff's
rear and thus avoid the collision.
In the case of Lowder v. Holley, Utah, 233 P. 2nd 350,
plaintiff failed to observe defendant's vehicle approaching from the right and defendant was 250 feet away.
(Our case defendant was 750 feet away when plaintiff
entered the intersection.) The Court held that whether
plaintiff's failure to see defendant's approach was negli-
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gence was a question of fact for the jury. So also our
case should he a question of fact for the jury. The Court
also observed that had plaintiff seen the defendant it
could be found to he within his duty of due care to assume
that the defendant would yield the right of way..
The case of Porulson v. Marvness, Utah, 241 P. 2nd
152, p~resented the question of whether p~laintiff's failure
to look again after he had looked to his right and left
before starting into the intersection and no traffic was in
sight for a distance of 400 feet (his visibility sight distance), and was struck constituted negligence and also
whether such negligence proximately contributed to
cause the collision, was held to have been properly
submitted to the jury. See also Hard1nan v. Thurmmn,
239 P~ 2d 215, and Nielson v. Mauchley, 202 P. 2nd 547,
for ap·plication of the same rule.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF
PART OF THE EVIDENCE.

Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" is a map or sketch drawn to
a scale of 1" equals 25 feet, covering the intersection of
Highways 91 and 114 and surrounding area. It was admitted in evidence "excepting as to markings upon the
highway with resp·ect to distances and locations, and the
possible change in respect to one corner of the intersection, which are not received in evidence at this time, without their being sup~p~orted by the· record." (Tr.3).
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tances and locations have reference to the red sight di~s
tance line extending easterly from stop sign at southeast
corner of Highway 114, the distance line in green s·hown
on Highway 91, and the figures shown upon it. It will be
noted on Exhibit "A" that the line shown on Highway
91 is broken up into three parts and the figures showing
the distances in feet from left to right are the following:
45', 52' and 268'. Adding these figures together they
total 365 feet, which would represent the total linear
feet from the sight distance point on Highway 91 to the
point of impact. Since these figures were not admitted
in evidence they can ,have no bearing on the outcome of
the case, excepting only that they might later be supported by the evidence ( Tr. 3). The figures were not
later ·supported by the evidence but the sight distance
line was later supported by the evidence (Tr. 9 and 10).
The distance from the intersection of the sight distance
line on Highway 91 to the approximate center of Geneva
Road (Highway 114) is 368 feet (Tr. 12). A scale, Exhibit "F·", corresponding to the map, 25 feet to the inch,
was introduced and received in evidence ( Tr. 12 and 13).
The Court apparently became confused as to the actual testimony on this point. In its memorandum decision at page 3 the· Court says: "As shown on plaintiff's
Exhibit "A" a line drawn from the stop, sign eastwardly
past the first obstruction to visibility, gave him an unobstructed view up the highway for 268 feet." Also further
on on page· 3 of its memorandum decision the Court refers
to the sight distance as being 268 feet. The testimony and
the fact are that the distance is 368 feet, a hundred feet
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further down the highway. Not only does the testimony
establish this fact (T·r. 12), hut by using the scale, Exhibit "F:" and ap~plying it to the map, the distance may
readily he established. The map Exhibit "A" and the
S'cale Exhibit "F·" are both in evidence. In this instance
the Court in interpreting the testimony did not give
plaintiff the benefit of all of the competent evidence most
favorable to pJ.aintiff, hut actually accepted as evidence
a distance figure of 268 feet that was contrary to the
evidence and certainly less favorable to plaintiff than
the actual figure of 368 feet. It was less favorable to
plaintiff for the reason that plaintiff could ·see further
down Highway 91 before leaving the stop sign at the
southeast corner of Highway 114. If no traffic were in
view he would naturally have more time in which to cross
the intersection. He would not have to "race" in order to
cross ~ver. Had th·e sight distance been 100 feet less
crossing would have been considerably more hazardous
and would have put plaintiff on notice that he must proceed even more cautiously.
It should also be borne in mind that the figure 268
~shown on the map Exhibit "A" was excluded from evidence and never thereafter supplied during the trial
From the actual testimony of 368 feet· and the excluded
testimony of 268 feet, the inference to he drawn from
the 368 feet would certainly be more favorable to plaintiff than the 268 feet.

POINT THREE
THE COURT RELIED UPON MATTERS WHI·CH IT HAD
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.
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In its memorandum decision the Court referred to
and relied upon matters that were actually excluded as
evidence and not part of the testimony.
At the bottom of page one of its memorandum decision and the top of page two the, Court says:
"He was well acquainted with this intersection, knew it was a very busy way and had to wait
at times for as much as fifteen minutes for traffic
to clear."
On page three of the me1norandum decision the Court
emphasized further that it relied on excluded testimony
for it again said:
"* * * traveling through an intersection which
he kne·w to he so busy that he had to wait as much
as fifteen minutes on previous occasions for traffic to clear * * *"
Attention is now directed to the actual testimony on
this point and the Court's ruling thereon. On page 52 of
the transcript of the testimony, Leonard Bates, the plaintiff, was asked on direct examination by Mr. Stewart:

Q. Now can you tell me the experience you had
in crossing the highway~
MR. HANSEN: We object to that, your Honor,
as being incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, what happened before that time. I
don't think it is material or relevant, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I am wondering about this,
Mr. Stewart. I hardly get the point on it.
Will you tell me what you claim for it~
MR. STEWART: Yes, your Honor. I expect to
show that 91 is a busy highway, and that he
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had oecasion to cross it daily at least twice
'
and that he knew of that situation,
and I ex-'
pect to show that on many occasions he had
waited as long as fifteen minutes to get an
op·ening to cross that highway. And I expect to show that on this occasion of the accident, he was five minutes waiting there or
.
'
approocrmately
that, before he started to cross
the highway.
THE C·OURT: Now let me have the question
again, will you please, Mr. Reporter~
(Question read.) ·
THE COURT : Don't you think your question is
p·retty general to arrive at that, Mr. Stewart?
MR. STEWART: It may he.
On transcript 53, continuing:
THE COURT: I think it is, that he can describe
tipping his hat to a lady, and be just as much
in answer. It would be immaterial.
The plaintiff actually testified that highway 91 was
not always so busy with traffic. Continuing the test.imony (Tr. 53).
MR. STEWART: Q. State if you had any difficulty in crossing the highway~
A. No, I never had.
Q. Was there much traffic there¥
MR. HANS·EN: On which day¥
MR. STEWART: Any day.
A. Well, sometimes, there was quite a lot of
traffic, and on other times you can go and you
wouldn't hardly strike any. Now you can take
it coming from the north, and it is lots easier
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cause you see back down the hignway further."
It is plainly evident that the Court was confused,
if not wholly mislead, by giving consideration to matters
not actually in evidence. Plaintiff's answer to the question above clearly shows that only on sp·ecial occasions
did he have to wait 'long. The fifteen minute wait not in
evidence evidently unduly exaggerated th.e amount of
traffic at this intersection in the mind of the Court and
doubtless played an important part in its conclusion,
otherwise why the repetition of the excluded tender of
testimony in its memorandum decision~
Most certainly the inference to be drawn from the
consideration of the excluded testimony was less favorable to plaintiff than if it had never been relied upon by
the Court.

P·OINT FOUR
INACCURATELY COPYING JURY VERDICT INTO ITS
JUDGMENT AND THEN REFUSING TO CORRECT THE
ERROR.

The essential part of the jury verdict, omitting the
Court and cause for economy of space, reads:
We, the jury impanelled in the, above entitled
cause, find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants jointly and ·severally and
assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
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Physical injury, p·ain and suffering________ $
Medica1 Exp'enses ----------------·--·----------------------$ 214.50
Loss of earnings during recu·peration ......$1,000.00
Permanent disability ___________________________________ .$4, 000.00
Pickup truck ------------------------------------------------$ 565.00
Total -------------------------------------------- _____ .......$5, 779.50
Dated March 16, 1954
(s) Waldo Lamoreaux
F·oreman.
The judgment entered by the Court sup·plied a cipher
in the verdict opposite the first item "Physical injury,
pain and suffering" thus $
0, so that the judgment
of the· Court reads :
Physical injury, pain and suffering..........$
0
MedicJal Expenses ----------------------------------------$ 214.50
Loss of earnings during recup·eration......$1,000.00
Permanent disability ----------------------------------$4,000.00
Damage to Pickup truck______________________________ $ 565.00
Total --------------------------------------------------------$5,779.50
On Ap~ril 23, 1954, the plaintiff filed Notice of Motion to he heard on Ap~ril 30, 1954, and it was duly argued on s aid date, among other things, that the judgment
is contrary to the verdict rendered by the jury in said
matter. In its argument the counsel for plaintiff pointe~
out to the Court that the judgment showed a cipher opposite the item "Physical injury, pain and suffering" which
the verdict did not ~shoiW and that this variance 'between
the judgment and the verdict was in err'or and did not
truly represent the verdict. To this matter the, Court concluded that the verdict without the cipher and the judg1
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ment showing a cipher were one and the same thing, that
they both meant the same thing. The court erred in no~
correcting this discrepancy for the reason that without
the cipher in the verdict it could be inferred that the
jury had inadvertently overlooked this item, whereas
with the cipher added it leaves no room for doubt that
the jury actually concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no physical injury, pain and suffering. If the plaintiff
had suffered no injury, pain and suffering he would
hardly be entitled to recover damages for permanent disability, which is t o say that if there were no injury there
could be no disability, permanent or otherwise. There
was actual injury, pain and suffering, amply testified to
and stipulated to as shown by the transcript, hereinafter
more specifically referred to, so the insertion of the
cipher was truly a vital misrepresentation.
Concerning the plaintiff having suffered physical injury, pain and suffering, Mrs. Myrtle Bates, plaintiff's
wife, testified (Tr. 27 et. seq.) that plaintiff had a cut 2'l2"
long across the hack of his head requiring four or five
stitches; ,a lump about the size of a walnut on his right
cheek bone; a lump about the size of an egg on his forehead at the hair line; his right eye swollen shut, his face·
swollen; his face a mass of 'abrasions; a sprained shoulder; his knee swollen and cut, as were his legs in different
places and bruised and scraped; his hands were swollen
and he could not shut them; he had seven fractured ribs
and a punctured liver.
It was stipulated by counsel for plaintiff and defendant that plaintiff had ·seven ribs fractured (Tr. 29 and
1
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30) and the Court stated the stipulation to the jury in
the following words: "The Court: And the jury may
accept that stip.ulation as facts established in the case."
(Tr. 30).

Mrs. Bate.s testified that plaintiff's memory has not
'been nearly so good since the accident as it was prior
thereto (Tr. 31), and Mrs. Hilda Pulley testified about
plaintiff's memory to the same effect (Tr. 45). Also
Leonard Bates, the plaintiff ( Tr. 63).
From the foregoing the ·jury, if it found for the
plaintiff at all, must find that the p!laintiff had suffered
physical injury, pain and ~suffering. It is inescapa;ble that
the omission of any figure opposite that item in its verdict was ·due to oversight and not with deliberate intention to ignore the item. The -cipher added by the Court
in its judgment is clearly in error and the Court's refusal to delete the cipher when it was timely called to its
attention was likewise error.
On the orbher hand, the defendant has not been injured hy the oversight of the jury in failing to make an
award of damages to plaintiff sp~ecifically for physical
injury, pain and suffering. Defendant has suffered no
financial or p~ecuniary loss on ac0ount of the omission.
The only one to be hurt by this omission is the plaintiff.
Plaintiff is satisfied with the amount set out in the verdict and does not raise the question as to the adequacy
of the verdict. For the sake of accuracy and fairness
plaintiff desires the judgment to reflect the true fact
in the judgment on file so that no advantage may be forfeited or disadvantage suffered as a result of his failure
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to point out the discrepancy at this. time and to have it
corrected.
The substance of the verdict is an award of $5,779.50 in favor of the plaintiff. The failure by the jury
to supply figures opposite each item set out in the verdict
by the jury g oes only to form and not to substance.
In 53 Am. Juris., Sec. 1054 p·. 730 we read:
"Where the jury hy their verdict for plaintiff
implicitly finds facts from \Vhich the law pTesumes that general damages follow, so that a
cause of action for actual or compensatory damages is conclusively established, the fact that the
verdict is for exemplary damages 0nly is an error
in form and not of substance and is not grounds
for reversal. Under such circumstances it will be
regarded as a general verdict covering all damages, both actual and punitive.''
1

1

CONCLUSION
It is the sole prerogative of the jury to determine
questi ons of fact where reasonable minds might differ
as to the conclusions reached. Different factors to be
taken into consideration and determined were speed of
defendants' truck, speed of plaintiff's truck, exact point
of impact, ohstructi ons to vision of plaintiff to the east
from Highway 114, whether plaintiff or defendant, or
either of them, kept a proper lookout, and whether the
failure of either so to do, and which one, was the proximate cause of the accident.
It is earnestly contended by the plaintiff that the
trial court was wrong in its determination that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent ;as a matter of law, and
1

1
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that his negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of
the injury and damage suffered by the plaintiff. The
judgment 0f the trial court should be set aside and the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff he p~ermitted to
stand.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT MURRAY STEWART
Attorney for Plaintiff an.d Appellant
627 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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